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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are composed of
small, low cost, resource-constrained computing nodes equipped
with low power wireless transceivers. Generally, they are em-
bedded in their environment to perform some specific mon-
itoring and/or control function. Unlike wired networks that
have dedicated routers for network connectivity and message
forwarding, every node in a WSN can act as a router in a
multi-hop network. A WSN can offer a cheap, application-
specific solution in a variety of situations including military
and disaster response scenarios, where other approaches are
not viable. Due to their unattended nature and deployment
in possibly hostile environmental conditions, there are many
challenges in ensuring that a WSN is formed effectively and
survives long enough to fulfil its function. Securing a WSN
against attack is a particular challenge. Traditional encryption
mechanisms are resource hungry and are not sufficient alone
to provide a complete solution. This project is concerned with
secure routing protocols. Formal methods are used to model and
analyse the design of existing protocols and to demonstrate some
previously unreported weaknesses.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), Routing
Protocol, Formal Modelling, DoS (Denial of Service) Attacks,
Protocol Verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are composed of low
cost, low power, small computing nodes, communicating by
wireless to monitor and/or control some aspect of the environ-
ment in which they are embedded. The number of nodes in a
WSN may vary from a few to a few thousand. Unlike wired
networks, that have dedicated routers for network connectivity
and message forwarding, every node in a WSN may be called
upon to act as a router. The main aim is to route data from
nodes that detect some event in the environment (source)
to nodes that require information about that event (sink or
base station). Routing is the process of moving data between
nodes from source to sink. A routing protocol determines
which path(s) the data should follow. Due to their broadcast
transmission, limited resources, unattended nature and hostile
environmental conditions, there are many challenges to ensur-
ing the secure and reliable operation of a WSN. This work
addresses the problem of the vulnerability of WSNs to denial
of service (DoS) attacks leading to the disruption of the flow
of data from source to sink.
Many DoS attacks have been recognised in the litera-
ture [11], [15]. The vulnerability of routing protocols to
these attacks has been discussed and new protocols have
been developed, or older protocols modified, to guard against
them [11].
But the techniques used so far generally rely on visual
inspection and simulation which are often not adequate for the
detection of worst case scenarios. It is possible that bugs and
vulnerabilities remain. The work described here investigates
to what extent the application of formal methods leads to
more effective bug detection in routing protocols for WSNs.
By using formal methods, not only are the assumptions of
protocols clearly modelled, but also all possible behaviours of
the models can be examined for error conditions.
Our aim in this research is to develop a formal framework
that can be used to check the resilience of WSN routing
protocols to denial of service attacks. Finite state models
of protocols are described using PROMELA [7] and sim-
ple liveness properties are checked using the SPIN model
checker [7]. Properties are checked for all possible topologies
of N nodes, where N is typically small (< 10) in order allow
the automatic verification to complete with the computing
resources (memory and CPU time) available. This has proved
to be an effective bug-hunting approach and weaknesses in
existing protocols have been discovered.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section II
briefly discusses related work; denial of service attacks are
described in section III; our formal framework is introduced in
section IV and its application to existing protocols is described
in section V. Conclusions and further work are presented in
section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Other researchers have realized that computer simulation is
often inadequate for finding errors in routing protocols and
the development of formal models to check various aspects of
routing protocols is becoming more common. Formal models
have been used also in the analysis of security protocols. A
representative selection of this work is identified below.
TinySec and LEAP have been modelled using the high-level
formal language HLPSL [14]. The authors found two attacks,
a man-in-the-middle attack and a type flaw attack, which
show that confidentiality is compromised and an intruder may
obtain confidential data from a node in the network. They
also checked SNEP [13], which is the base component of
the security protocol ’Security Protocols for Sensor Networks’
(SPINS) and by formal analysis disclosed an attack that
allowed the acceptance of a false request message from an
intruder. Y. Hanna et al. [5] developed a new approach (Slede)
that extracts a PROMELA model of a protocol from its im-
plementation in NesC, a topology description and an intruder
template library. They verified µTESLA [1] and LEAP [12]
using this method.
Other work has used SPIN to analyse security properties
in extensions of ad hoc routing protocols based on Dynamic
Source Routing (Ardiadne and endairA) [2]. The authors have
used an automated security evaluation process and analysed all
topologies for networks of up to 5 nodes. Our work extends
the application of this approach to routing protocols for WSN.
III. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
We use the term denial of service in a general sense to mean
the adverse effect of any malicious external agent (attacker)
on the correct or timely delivery of data from source nodes
to sink nodes. The particular focus is on the effects of denial
of service on routing protocols in WSNs. A brief summary
of attacks that we have considered is presented below. More
detailed surveys of attacks are available [11], [15].
Spoofing is the altering or replaying of routing information
(data, beacon or acknowledgement packets). It can lead to the
creation of inaccurate or unstable routes. False injection is the
introduction of extra data or control packets into the network.
It consumes bandwidth and may cause routing loops. The
main aim of this attack is to consume resources wastefully. A
Sybil attack occurs when a malicious node presents multiple
identities simultaneously within the network. Such a node may
be used to subvert routing protocols that rely on redundancy,
such as multi-path protocols.
In a black hole attack, a malicious node joins the net-
work and then either discards all the messages it receives or
performs selective forwarding. A sink hole is a potent form
of black hole in which the attacker makes itself particularly
attractive to all nodes within its range, usually by advertising
low cost routes to all destinations. In a wormhole attack,
an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the
network, tunnels them to another location, and retransmits
them there into the network. A wormhole not only disturbs
correct routing but is also the precursor to many other attacks
black hole, sink hole, etc.
The HELLO flood attack involves the use of a high power
transmitter by an attacker to broadcast routing or other in-
formation, with the purpose of convincing every node within
radio range that the attacker is a neighbour. The attacker may
then be established in routes that are unusable by other nodes
since their transmitters are much less powerful.
Jamming is a physical layer attack instigated by creating
radio noise in a particular physical area. Traffic analysis attacks
are launched by capturing packets in order to estimate the
location of the sending node. Thus, important nodes such as
the base station can be identified and and targeted.
IV. FORMAL FRAMEWORK IN SPIN
In order to rigorously check routing protocols against at-
tacks we have developed a modelling framework that allows
automatic analysis of protocols using SPIN. The main aim
of the modelling is to enable checks against certain attacks
for all possible network topologies. A network topology is
represented by a boolean N ×N matrix, where N is the total
number of nodes in the network. A ’1’ in the matrix at (i, j)
indicates a connection between nodes i and j; ’0’ indicates
no connection. We assume symmetric or bidirectional links,
so the value of (i, j) is equal to (j, i) for all i and j. Also, we
assume that the channel is error-free, i.e. no message is lost
in communication. The presence of bugs detected in such an
ideal radio environment is a clear indication that a protocol
will exhibit similar problems in a more realistic environment.
Primitive communication channels in PROMELA provide
point-to-point communication. In order to represent the broad-
cast nature of the wireless medium, we model it as a process
that enables communication between all nodes in radio range
(as determined by the connection matrix). A more efficient
analysis could be performed if PROMELA offered broadcast
communication as a primitive, since the number of states in
the model would be smaller. We apply some ad-hoc techniques
to reduce the number of states to be explored. For example, in
a unicast transmission only the destination node is interested
in receiving data, so one can reduce the number of states to be
considered by allowing other nodes to ignore such messages.
There are other cases in which some nodes are not interested
in broadcast messages, e.g. the base station does not need
to receive its own transmissions. We have eliminated such
messages to further reduce the state space. On the other hand,
an attacker is normally eavesdropping on the channel, so we
ensure that attackers are able to hear all messages transmitted
within their range.
Typically, a model comprises a process for the wireless
medium, as described above, and processes representing wire-
less nodes acting in one of the following roles: source, sink
(base station), relay or attacker. Each wireless node process is
instantiated from a PROMELA template that represents node
behaviour as determined by the role in the protocol and attack
under consideration. This approach is illustrated in Section V.
Given such a model, the behaviour of the network can be
explored by using SPIN to check simple properties, expressed
in linear-time temporal logic. Most often, the property of in-
terest is a response property of the form ‘whenever the source
transmits a message, it is received eventually by the sink’.
This property is checked both in the presence and absence of
attackers. A great advantage of using a model-checker such
as SPIN to test such properties is that a counter-example, in
the form of a system trace, is provided automatically by the
tool when the property fails to hold. The counter-example can
be interpreted to determine the exact nature of the flaw in the
protocol.
We have tested various published protocols to confirm the
utility of our framework. The protocols that have been tested
so far are TinyOS [11], Authentic TinyOS using µTESLA [1],
Rumour Routing [3], LEACH [6], MCF [4], Directed Diffu-
sion [8], Basic INSENS [10] and Enhanced INSENS [9]. The
application of the framework to the first two of these protocols
is discussed in detail below.
V. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. TinyOS Protocol
We start our modelling with the TinyOS protocol [11] which
is the simplest of all WSN routing protocols. This protocol
constructs a spanning tree rooted at the base station. Data then
flows from source nodes back to the base station using paths
in the spanning tree.
Two types of message are involved: hello beacon messages
and data messages. The notation Ni → Nj : M is used to
denote that node Ni transmits message M to node Nj . A
broadcast transmission is indicated by the use of ∗ in place of
Nj and indicates that message M is transmitted to all nodes
within radio range of Ni. A brief description of the protocol
follows.
The base station periodically broadcasts a hello beacon
which is flooded throughout the network.
B → ∗ : (beacon, IDB) (1)
A node, on first hearing a hello beacon, makes the trans-
mitting node its parent and ignores any future beacons. The
node then rebroadcasts the beacon with its own ID:
Nodei → ∗ : (beacon, IDi) (2)
This process is repeated throughout the network until the
spanning tree is established.
A source node, upon sensing a significant event in its envi-
ronment, unicasts the data back to its parent. Data messages
are unicast from node to parent node until the base station is
reached.
Nodei → Nodeparent : (data, IDparent,PAYLOAD) (3)
A simple version of the protocol is modelled in which there
is a base station B, source node S, relay N and attacker
A. All beacon messages are broadcast; data messages are
unicast. It is assumed that the attacker can hear all messages.
For various attacks, we check the required property that data
always reaches the base station from the source node, in all
topologies where there is a path between them. The modelling
of attacks is discussed below.
1) Spoofing: In a spoofing attack, the attacker transmits
the hello beacon using the ID of the source node instead of
its own ID. The required property is violated and the trace
reveals that the problem is caused by the creation of a routing
loop in topologies in which the source node and the attacker
share a neighbour, since the source node and its neighbour
are established as each other’s parent and data loops between
them forever. Fig. 1 illustrates one such topology, detected
using SPIN from an analysis of all 4-node topologies.
Fig. 1. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful spoofing attack
Fig. 2. Topology for which SPIN traces successful black hole and sink hole
attacks
2) Black hole: A black hole is modelled simply by having
the attacker forward beacon messages correctly but drop data
messages randomly. The required property is violated and
the trace confirms that when the attacker is a parent in the
data forwarding path, data may not reach the base station.
Fig. 2 illustrates a successful black hole attack in one topology
detected using SPIN. Note that here node A behaves normally
during beacon forwarding but drops data once it becomes the
parent of the source node S.
3) Sink hole: We model a sink hole attack by having not
only the base station, but also the attacker, initiate the broad-
cast of hello beacons. The attacker also ignores legitimate
beacons from the base station. In this model, the required
property is violated and the trace confirms that when the
attacker acts as a sink hole, the source and intermediate nodes
transfer data to it rather than the base station. Fig. 2 illustrates
one such trace detected using SPIN in an analysis of all 4-node
topologies. In this example, node A acts as a base station
and broadcasts a hello beacon (msg01). The source node
receives this beacon before the legitimate beacon (msg03) and
so transfers data to the attacker (msg04).
Note that for this simple protocol in such a small network,
the scenarios illustrating the sink hole and black hole attacks
are identical. However, the behaviour of the attackers is
different in each case and, in general, the scenarios illustrating
the attacks will be different. This is shown clearly when
considering the resistance of the Authentic TinyOS protocol
to each type of attack.
Fig. 3. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful hello flood attack
4) HELLO flood: The high power transmitter of the attacker
in a hello flood attack is modelled by modifying the connection
matrix to represent the fact that the attacker can establish a
unidirectional link with all other nodes in the network. Note
that this is contrary to our usual assumption of symmetric links
but is an accurate reflection of reality in this case.
Analysis of such a model shows that the required property
is not satisfied and the trace reveals the cause of the problem.
When the attacker broadcasts hello beacons it is heard by
all other nodes which then establish the attacker as their
parent in the spanning tree. Data from any source node whose
transmitter is not powerful enough to reach the attacker is lost.
Fig. 3 illustrates one 5-node topology, detected using SPIN,
that illustrates the problem. Notice that msg02 is received
by all nodes, including the source node S which ignores the
legitimate beacon from node N and establishes A as its parent.
The transmission of msg05 does not reach the attacker due to
the low power transmitter of the source node. Of course, it is
trivial for the attacker in this case to act also as a sink hole if
it chooses.
5) Wormhole: In order to model the effects of a wormhole,
the channel process can be modified to create a tunnel between
the base station and a source node. The attacking node is
hidden and all other nodes behave in the normal way. The
tunnel only forwards beacons from the base station to the
source node. Note that the attacker does not transfer data
received from the tunnel, as the aim of a wormhole attack
is to drop data transmitted in the tunnel.
Analysis of this model shows that the required property
is not satisfied and the trace reveals that when a wormhole
exists between the base station and a source node, the source
establishes the base station as its parent instead of one of the
nodes within its range; thus, when it transmits data, the data
is lost as it is addressed to a node that is reachable only via
the wormhole. Fig. 4 illustrates a successful wormhole attack
in one of the topologies detected using SPIN in an analysis of
all 4-node topologies.
An alternative approach to the modelling of a wormhole can
be adopted, in which the creation of the wormhole between
two distinct attacking nodes is represented explicitly. The
Fig. 4. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful wormhole attack
disadvantage of such an approach is that it increases the size
of the state space that needs to be explored in the analysis. Our
model is simpler and simulates the effect of the tunnel rather
than its creation. In circumstances where it is the creation of
the tunnel that is the primary object of study, the more costly
modelling approach should be adopted.
6) Other attacks: We have also studied the effects of the
false injection and Sybil attacks on the TinyOS protocol. In
fact, the sink hole attack discussed earlier relies on the false
injection of a hello beacon by the attacker. The Sybil attack has
been modelled by having the attacker transmit hello beacons
using both its real ID and a fake ID. The required property is
not satisfied in this case and the trace shows that neighbours
of the attacker might establish a non-existent node as their
parent and then attempt to forward data to it. In the TinyOS
protocol this attack resembles a spoofing attack.
B. Authentic TinyOS using µTESLA
The Authentic TinyOS protocol uses µTESLA [1] to au-
thenticate messages. µTESLA is a lightweight authentication
protocol aimed at reducing the computing resource require-
ments of the nodes that implement it. This makes it practicable
for use with the resource constrained nodes of a WSN. The
Authentic TinyOS protocol is similar to the TinyOS Beaconing
protocol considered in Section V-A. The main difference is that
the base station uses a µTESLA key, Ki, in the ith beaconing
interval to generate a message authentication code (MAC) for
the beacon. Ki is derived using a public hash chain whose
seed is known only to the base station and thus no other node
can generate or predict the next key. The base station starts
by broadcasting the following message with t=0:
B → ∗ : (beacon, IDB ,MACKt+1) (4)
The receiving node checks if the beacon has been received
in the first beaconing interval i.e. that
(Tcur + δ − To)/Tint < Ii + d,
where Tcur is the current time at the receiver, To is the start
time of the first beacon interval, Tint is the interval between
beacons, δ is the maximum synchronisation error between the
base station and other nodes, d is the key disclosure delay in
seconds, and Ii is the interval number (i.e. 1,2,3,..). If this does
not hold, the beacon is ignored otherwise it is pushed into a
FIFO queue as the pair (ID, MAC) and the node broadcasts
the beacon, using its own ID.
Nodei → ∗ : (beacon, IDi,MACKt+1) (5)
This process is repeated throughout the network. When the
next time interval begins, the base station discloses the key
for the previous interval by broadcasting:
B → ∗ : (beacon, IDB ,Kt+1,MACKt+2) (6)
This is again broadcast to all neighbours and each node
chooses the first authentic beacon sender as its parent and
then ignores further beacons. Each node also retransmits the
authentic beacon.
Nodei → ∗ : (beacon, IDi,Kt,MACKt+1) (7)
It is not necessary to model the details of the authenti-
cation mechanism to undertake a useful formal analysis of
the protocol. It is assumed that µTESLA provides a reliable
authentication mechanism. The focus of the analysis is on the
effect of attacks on the protocol, given this assumption.
In order to model the Authentic TinyOS protocol, the model
of the TinyOS Beaconing protocol is modified so that the base
station sends two beacons: the first with a null Key field and
the second with a key that can be used easily to authenticate
the previous beacon. The message format is now (Type, ID,
Key, MAC). The MAC is modelled simply by using a number.
The base station sends the first message as (beacon, B, 0, 1)
i.e. the MAC is 1 and the Key is null. Then the second message
(beacon, B, 1, 2) is sent, where the key 1 will authenticate the
previous MAC and the new MAC is set to 2 for future use.
Using this simple model, the whole protocol can be analysed.
Nodes check the authenticity of a beacon by testing if the
MAC field of an entry (ID, MAC) in the FIFO matches the Key
received in the beacon. Beacon intervals are modelled simply
by waiting until all nodes have received a beacon before a new
beacon is initiated by the base station.
Analysis of this model shows that the Authentic TinyOS
protocol successfully resists the sink hole and false injection
attacks to which the simpler TinyOS Beaconing protocol was
shown to be susceptible in Sections V-A3 and V-A6.
However, our analysis shows that several other attacks still
succeed, despite the use of authenticated broadcasts. Fig. 5
shows a successful spoofing attack, Fig. 6 shows a successful
black hole attack, Fig. 7 shows a successful hello flood
attack, and Fig. 8 shows a successful wormhole attack. All of
these scenarios were discovered using the counter-examples
generated by SPIN in an analysis of all 4-node and 5-node
topologies.
C. Other Routing Protocols
We have modelled and checked other routing protocols
such as Minimum Cost Forwarding (MCF) [4], Rumour Rout-
ing [3], LEACH [6], and Directed Diffusion [8]. Our approach
confirmed that they are susceptible to spoofing, black hole,
Fig. 5. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful spoofing attack
Fig. 6. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful black hole attack
Fig. 7. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful hello flood attack
Fig. 8. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful wormhole attack
Fig. 9. Topology for which SPIN traces a successful sink hole attack against
the Directed Diffusion protocol
sink hole, hello flood, wormhole and Sybil attacks. These
results are as expected; these protocols have already been
identified as susceptible to such attacks in several literature
reviews. But we have also obtained some interesting results
using our approach which have not been mentioned before.
These are discussed briefly below.
First of all let us consider Fig. 9, showing a model of the
Directed Diffusion protocol in the presence of a sink hole
attack. Here the attacker behaves just like the base station.
As soon as it hears an interest message from the legitimate
base station, the attacker replays that message, identifying
itself as the base station. Thus the source node will now send
data matching the interest message to both the attacker and
the legitimate base station. We model the effect of a sink
hole attack by flooding an interest message from the attacker
in which the ID is shown as the ID of the base station.
Earlier research has suggested that data in this case will reach
both the attacker and the base station. But our SPIN trace in
Fig. 9 confirms a worse scenario in which sometimes data
may never reach the base station in the presence of a sink
hole attack. From Fig. 9, it is seen that the attacker floods an
interest message (msg02) as soon as it receives a legitimate
one (msg01) from the base station. In this case, node Nb
receives the interest message from the attacker (msg02) before
the legitimate message from node Na (msg09), which it then
ignores. Thus, the gradient is set only towards the attacker,
node A. In this way, a gradient is never established with
node Na and so data will never reach the base station. Note
that whenever the base station broadcasts its interest message
again, the same process can be repeated.
Secondly, we have discovered an unreported bug in the
Rumour Routing protocol [3] using our model-checking ap-
proach. The bug can be illustrated using the same topology
as for Directed Diffusion, shown in Fig. 9. Consider the case
in which a query has visited all nodes before the agent has
started. In that case, the agent arrives at each node after the
query has been passed on. The exhaustive search made by
SPIN reveals the problem. Suppose in the topology in Fig. 9
the query has taken a path of B − Na − Nb − A − B − A.
Note, as node A has no unseen neighbours, it forwards the
query again to node B and node B forwards it back to A
since it sent it last time to node Na. Now suppose the agent is
started and takes the path S −Nb−Na−B. In this case, the
query and the agent will never meet and the required property
is violated.
Note that it is extremely unlikely that this scenario will
be detected using visual inspection even in small networks,
but that formal analysis of all possible topologies of a 5-node
network reveals it quickly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have considered the modelling and analysis
of a simple routing protocol (TinyOS Beaconing) using SPIN.
Other researchers have already described its vulnerability to
attack and we have confirmed these results using our formal
framework. We have checked a simple requirement property
that whenever a source node transmits a data message it
is received eventually by the base station. The requirement
property has been checked both in the presence and absence
of various attacks. Analysis shows that the property may not
be satisfied in the presence of any of the attacks that have
been considered. The counter-examples generated by SPIN are
extremely useful in determining the reason for the failure of
the required property in each case.
We have applied the same approach to an analysis of a more
robust protocol (Authentic TinyOS with µTESLA) and have
confirmed that it can resist sink hole and false injection attacks
but remains susceptible to other attacks.
Furthermore, the formal framework that we have adopted
has revealed flaws in the Rumour Routing and Directed
Diffusion protocols which, so far as we know, have not been
identified before.
These results encourage us to believe that formal analysis
by model-checking can be used successfully to discover flaws
in WSN routing protocols that may not be discovered by visual
inspection or simulation.
We intend to apply this approach to the analysis of more
robust routing protocols and to use it to assist in the develop-
ment of a new protocol that will be more resistant to denial
of service attacks.
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